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only when he has gone into possession or taken title." The provi-
sions of this statute were construed so as to deny the purchaser any
rights to the vendor's policy, unless expressly so provided.12
In applying the rule, the New York courts recognize the basic
principles of insurance law which limit recovery on the policy to those
in privity or named as beneficiaries therein.' 3 In addition, the courts
apparently reason that where the risk of loss falls upon the purchaser,
he has an insurable interest,14 and should not depend on the vendor's
policy for indemnification. Thus the equitable concept of the vendor
holding the proceeds of his policy as trustee for the benefit of the
purchaser, as recognized by the majority of American jurisdictions,15
is rejected in New York.' 6
The instant case presented the courts of New York with an op-
portunity to restrict the harsh application of the rule, to cases where
the purchaser is in possession but has not paid the premiums. A
rule which would, in such a case, allow the purchaser a proportionate
share of the insurance proceeds would achieve substantial justice. It
is submitted that the court's failure to seize upon this opportunity to
limit an inequitable rule was unfortunate. It would seem that if a
change is to be effected it is more likely to be brought about by legis-
lation than by judicial decision.
PROPERTY-MONEY LEFT ON SHELF IN BANK VAULT-MISLAID
NOT LosT.-Plaintiff sought to recover a $100 bill delivered by her
to an employee of defendant bank after she had discovered it lying
on the shelf of a writing booth adjacent to the safe-deposit vault, in
21 See Rosenbloom v. Maryland Ins. Co., 258 App. Div. 14, 16, 15 N. Y. S.
2d 304, 306 (4th Dep't 1939) ; New York Medical College v. 15-21 East 111th
Street Corp., 90 N. Y. S. 2d 591, 592 (Sup. Ct. 1949); see World Exhibit
Corp. v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 270 App. Div. 654, 658, 61 N. Y. S.
2d 889, 893 (2d Dep't), affd nern., 296 N. Y. 586, 68 N. E. 2d 876 (1946).
12 Matter of Bond & Mortgage Guarantee Co., 63 N. Y. S. 2d 120 (Sup.
Ct. 1946).
13 See Brownell v. Board of Education, supra note 9, at 374, 146 N. E. at
632. But see Persico v. Guernsey, 129 Misc. 190, 194, 220 N. Y. Supp. 689,
693 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mei., 222 App. Div. 719, 225 N. Y. Supp. 890 (4th Dep't
1927).
14 See Carpenter v. German American Ins. Co., 135 N. Y. 298, 31 N. E.
1015 (1892); Brooks v. Erie Fire Ins. Co., 76 App. Div. 275, 78 N. Y. Supp.
748 (3d Dep't 1902), affd inem., 177 N. Y. 572, 69 N. E. 1120 (1904) ; N. Y.
INsuRANcE LAW § 148.
25 See Note, 37 A. L. R. 1324 (1925), and cases collected therein.
6 2See Brownell v. Board of Education, 239 N. Y. 369, 372-74, 146 N. E.
630, 632 (1925). But see Persico v. Guernsey, supra note 13.
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an area restricted to defendant's employees, box lessees or their legal
representatives, and authorized public officers. The complaint was
dismissed. Held: The money, being mislaid and discovered in a re-
stricted area, should remain in the custody of the defendant, owner
of the locus in quo. Dolitsky v. Dollar Saz,. Bank, 118 N. Y. S. 2d
65 (N. Y. Munic. Ct. 1952).
To determine the rights of the finder as against those of the
owner of the place where the property is found, the principle set
forth in Armory v. Delamirie,- that the finder has possession against
all but the true owner, must be qualified by the distinction that the
owner of the locus in quo has the right of possession 2 to property
found in a private place.3 The reason advanced for this is that the
owner's general physical control and intent to keep others from his
property implies a similar control and intent over everything in and
on his property. 4 On the other hand, areas into which the public is
invited or permitted are classified as public,5 and the finder may be
entitled to the possession of property found in these places.
If the finder satisfies this public-private test, he must further
contend with the distinction between lost and mislaid goods: the
forner resulting from an accidental and involuntary loss of posses-
sion,0 and the latter from a forgetful loss of possession-as where one
voluntarily places a purse on a table and leaves, forgetting to pick it
up.7 Some courts make this distinction on the theory that at the
moment the property was deliberately deposited-with the intent to
pick it up later-it was placed in the possession or custody of the
1 1 Str. 505, 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (1722).
2 Possession is defined as ". . . a union of a physical control over the
goods in question, and of an intent to assume dominion over them." BROWN,
LAW OF PERSONAL PaOi'RTY 22 (1936).
3 However, treasure trove [". . . any gold or silver in coin, plate, or bullion
found concealed in the earth, or in a house or other private place, but not
lying on the ground . . . " 36 C. J. S. 770 (1943)] is an exception, and
when found on private property it is awarded to the finder. Groover v. Tippins,
51 Ga. App. 47, 179 S. E. 634 (1935); Vickery v. Hardin, 77 Ind. App. 558,
133 N. E. 922 (1922) ; Weeks v. Hackett, 104 Me. 264, 71 Atl. 858 (1908).
4 South Staffordshire Water Co. v. Sharman, [18961 2 Q. B. 44; see
HOLMES, TEE COMMON LAW 222-24 (1946); POLLOCK & WRIGHT, POSSESSION
IN THE COMMON LAW 41 (1888).
5 See Toledo Trust Co. v. Simmons, 52 Ohio App. 373, 3 N. E. 2d 661(1935) (caged-in area of bank as passageway for business visitors) ; Hamaker
v. Blanchard, 90 Pa. (9 Norris) 377 (1879) (hotel parlor) ; Bridges v. Hawkes-
worth, 21 L. J. Q. B. 75 (1851) (store).6 See Hoagland v. Forest Park Highlands Amusement Co., 170 Mo. 335,
70 S. W. 878 (1902) (purse on floor of restaurant adioining theater) ; Cleve-
land Ry. v. Dursehuk. 31 Ohio App. 248, 166 N. E. 909 (1928) ($20 on floor
of street car) ; Durfee v. Jones, 11 R. I. 588 (1877) (money in crevice of
old safe).
7 See McAvoy v. Medina, 11 Allen 548 (Mass. 1866) (purse on table);
Foulke v. N. Y. Cons. R. R., 228 N. Y. 269, 127 N. E. 237 (1920) (package
on subway seat).
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"house," so that as to a subsequent finder, the owner of the place
would be entitled to the property on the theory of prior possession.8
Another motive for making the lost-mislaid distinction rests on the
belief of the courts that the best interests of the true owner are served
by giving possession to the owner of the locus in quo, who is less
likely to abscond, will spend more effort and time to locate the true
owner, and is more easily found if the true owner remembers or re-
traces his steps. 9 Therefore, for the finder to gain possession, the
disputed property must be legally lost in a public place. 10
In New York, the courts have strictly adhered to the foregoing
distinctions. In Loucks v. Gallogly 11 the court, emphasizing the im-
portance of the distinction between lost and mislaid goods, held that
money found on a desk in the public part of a bank was mislaid and
belonged in the bank's possession. In Cohen v. Manufacturers Safe
Deposit Company,12 the Court of Appeals, holding for the plaintiff-
finder, illustrated the fine points of the public-private distinction, and
demonstrated how a seemingly controlled place, such as a safe-deposit
area,18 cannot be considered private unless there is evidence that only
8 See WALSH, LAW OF PROPERTY 115 (2d ed. 1937). Attached to the prior
possession of the mislaid property by the owner of the locus in quo is a duty
of care owed to the true owner. See Pyle v. Springfield Marine Bank, 330
Ill. App. 1, 70 N. E. 2d 257, 260 (1946) (trustee for true owner) ; Silcott v.
Louisville Trust Co., 205 Ky. 234, 265 S. W. 612, 614 (1924) (fiduciary cus-
tody owing "some duty"); Foster v. Fidelity Safe Deposit Co., 264 Mo. 89,
174 S. W. 376, 379 (1915) (a "... trust it cannot repudiate, and it should
exercise due care . . ").
9 See Loucks v. Gallogly, 1 Misc. 22, 26, 23 N. Y. Supp. 126, 129 (Albany
City Ct. 1892) (locus in quo is where true owner would most likely apply upon
missing his property) ; Silcott v. Louisville Trust Co., supra note 8, 265 S. W.
at 615.
20 The distinction between lost and mislaid goods plays an important role
in other actions besides replevin and conversion. See Hoagland v. Forest Park
Highlands Amusement Co., 170 Mo. 335, 70 S. W. 878 (1902) (assault and
battery) ; Foulke v. N. Y. Cons. R. R., supra note 7 (malicious prosecution) ;
Cleveland Ry. v. Durschuk, 31 Ohio App. 248, 166 N. E. 909 (1928) (false
imprisonment). In these cases the owner of the locus in quo resisted the de-
parture of the finder with the discovered property. The finder-plaintiff's suc-
cess in such litigation usually depends upon his right to the disputed property,
and this in turn depends upon whether it was lost or mislaid. If mislaid, the
owner of the premises, having the right to possession, would be justified in
resisting the claims of a "finder" who illegally sought to deprive him of his
possession. In another case, a larceny conviction depended on this distinction.
See Lawrence v. State, 1 Humph. 228 (Tenn. 1839) ; see also Kincaid v. Eaton,
98 Mass. 139 (1867) (where plaintiff was denied a reward offered for "lost"
money, the reason being that the money was really mislaid, not "lost").
11 Supra note 9.
12 297 N. Y. 266, 78 N. E. 2d 604 (1948).
13 See Comment, 10 CORNELL L. Q. 255, 257 n. 8 (1925) (discussion on
the practice of various safe-deposit companies in admitting friends and rela-
tives of box lessees and even non-customers into the vault areas).
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box lessees and bank employees were admitted into this area.14 The
instant case is distinguishable from the Cohen case, since here the
defendant-bank presented evidence which showed that the safe-deposit
area was exclusively restricted, thus proving its private character;
moreover, in the Cohen case the money was on the floor of the safe-
deposit booth (and thus lost), while in the present case the money
was on the shelf of the booth (and therefore inislaid).
While there is little dispute over the applicability of the private-
public distinction, the lost-mislaid criterion for determining the rights
of finders is open to criticism. 15  To say that the true owner en-
trusted the misplaced article to the possession of the owner of a
public place, avoids the real test of possession, namely, physical con-
trol and intent to exclude. Inasmuch as there is no real possession,
to hold that the owner of the public place is in possession, and there-
fore a bailee of mislaid but not lost goods, is unsound.' 0 Conse-
quently, the only proper justification for the distinction is that the
owner of the locus in quo will best serve the interests of the true
owner. If this be true, it would logically follow that finders of articles
lost in public places should also be required to deliver them to the
owners of such places. However, a policy favoring the owner of the
place may induce the finder to secrete his finding lest the owner of
the premises receive the fruits of his discovery. It is submitted that
the better rule is to require the finder to deliver mislaid, as well as
lost articles, to the police department for a reasonable period, after
which the finder would be entitled to possession.'7
14 When the Cohen case, supra note 12, was retried, the evidence showed
that on the day the money was found, the caged area was used as an inter-
viewing room for prospective box lessees and possible new accounts. See
Manufacturers Safe Deposit Co. v. Cohen, 200 Misc. 334, 336, 101 N. Y. S.
2d 820, 822 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
15 See WALSH, LAW OF PROPERTY 116 (2d ed. 1937) ; Morton, Public Policy
and the Finders Cases, 1 Wyo. L. J. 101, 108 (1947) ; Riesman, Possession and
the Law of Finders, 52 Hav. L. Rzv. 1105, 1117-23 (1939).
16 Bailment is defined as ".... the rightful possession of goods by one who
is not the owner." 4 WILLsoN, CoNTRAcTs 2888 (Rev. ed. 1936) (emphasis
added).
:1 The Administrative Code, City of New York, Section 435-4.1, does not
decide the question of possession; it merely requires "lost" property to be turned
over to the police property clerk; after three months the property is returned
to the finder, if not previously claimed by the true owner. Mislaid as well as
lost goods must be turned over to the property clerk. See Manufacturers
Safe Deposit Co. v. Cohen, 193 Misc. 900, 902, 85 N. Y. S. 2d 650, 653 (Sup.
Ct. 1948), rev'd mer. on other grounds, 277 App. Div. 854, 98 N. Y. S. 2d
197 (1st Dep't 1950).
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